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NOTES
LIABILITY FOR AIRCRAFT DAMAGE TO GROUND OCCUPIERS
-A STUDY OF CURRENT TRENDS IN TORT LAW
Tort law may properly be considered as an ever flexible body of
law constantly changing to meet the needs of society. It must be admitted, however, that legal concepts have not always succeeded in keeping apace with the development of the activity. A study of the considerations affecting liability growing out of aircraft damages to persons
and property on the ground seems useful in reflecting the present trends
and bases of tort law generally. Here the law, caught in a state of flux,
can be objectively appraised in an atmosphere unfettered by rigid
precedent.
Historically aviation was considered an ultrahazardous activity.
For this reason aircraft owners were absolutely liable for damage to
persons and property on the ground.' This rule of liability without
fault was adopted in England and many other foreign countries' as well
1. In 1910 the airplane was thought to be very dangerous to the public. See
Baldwin, Liability for Accidents in Aerial .Navigation,9 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1910). This
attitude was based, partly at least, on Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. R. 381 (N.Y. 1822),
holding a balloon owner liable for damage to the plaintiff since the aeronaut had no
control over his motion horizontally, having to descend when and how he could, hazarding all ground occupiers.
As late as 1938, the American Law Institute thought aviation was an ultrahazardous activity.

RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 520, Comment b (1938), states that no mat-

ter how carefully constructed, maintained, and operated, the airplane may crash, causing
injury to persons, structures, and chattels on the ground. The same idea was expressed
in Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Msic. 849, 851, 266 N.Y.S. 469, 472
(1933). The RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 520 (1938), Comment d, notes the dependency of
the airplane operators upon unpredictable weather conditions.
2. See Eubank, Land Damage Liability in. Aircraft Cases, 57 DIcK. L. REV. 188,
195, 196 (1953). The British Air Navigation Acts of 1920 and 1936, both imposing
absolute liability for ground damages, are discussed. The author mentioned that nearly
all the nations of continental Europe have or had the absolute liability rule in force.
Bulgaria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Hungary, Germany, Austria, Italy, Danzig,
Yugoslavia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Russia, and Norway were
listed.
International conferences to determine the basis of damage caused by foreign aircraft
have repeatedly adopted absolute liability. Rome Convention of 1952, Art. 1, 19 J. AIR
L. & Com. 447 (1952) ; Taormina Draft Revision of the Rome Convention on Damage
Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Art. 1, 17 J. AIR L. 194 (1950) ;
Mexico City Convention of 1951, Art. 1, 18 J. AIR L. 98 (1951) ; Rome Convention of
1933, Art. 2, 6 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 334, 336 (1937).
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as in those jurisdictions in the United States which adopted section five
of the Uniform Aeronautics Act.3
Due to the technological advancements made in the industry and to
the commendable safety records compiled since World War II, aviation
can no longer be said to be an ultrahazardous activity.' If the imposition of absolute liability is purely a question of whether or not aviation
is ultrahazardous, 5 then it would seem that the basis for this liability no
longer exists. Although courts,' legislatures,7 and authorities8 in the
field agree on this point, they differ as to the method which should be
3. UNIFORM AERONAUTICS AcT, § 5. The following states had adopted § 5: Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
4. In United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529, 531 (10th Cir. 1951), the court
acknowledged the many improvements in design, construction, operation, and maintenance. Aviation is relatively as safe as other methods of transportation. Insurance
rates for passengers are the same for train, bus, or airplane. In 1938 the passenger
fatality rate was 4.5 per 100 million passenger miles flown; in 1952 the rate was only
0.4 per 100 million miles. Over 16,000,000 take-offs and landings were made in the
United States during 1951 without causing death to any persons on the ground. CAB
statistics show that from March 1946 to March 7, 1953, there were only six air carrier
accidents which involved fatalities to persons on the ground in the United States, and
there were only four more such accidents in which persons on the ground were nonfatally injured. Only 15 persons on the ground have been killed in the greater New
York area in the past ten years whereas the automobile has killed 5,865 pedestrians.
See Orr, Is Aviation Ultrahazardous?, 21 INS. COUNSEL J. 48, 52-55 (1954). See also
Case Comment, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 (1955).
But see Prentiss v. National Airlines, 112 F.Supp. 306, 311-13 (D.N.J. 1953)
Parcell v. United States, 104 F.Supp. 110, 116 (S.D.W.Va. 1951).
5. It has been suggested that the question of absolute liability is merely one of
fact. "Once it has been determined that flying, even student flying, is not per se
ultrahazardous, the question of liability must be determined by general principles of

liability unless or until the Legislature . . . provides to the contrary." Boyd v. White,
128 C.A.2d 641, 655, 276 P.2d 92, 100 (1954). See Orr, supra note 4, at 53.
6. "The modern trend of authority is to hold the rule of res ipsa loquitur applicable
to airplane accidents .... ." United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529, 532 & n. 6 (10th
Cir. 1951) and cases cited therein; Boyd v. White, 128 C.A.2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954).
7. A trend to repeal section five of the Uniform Aeronautics Act imposing absolute liability on the basis of ultrahazardousness is discernible. In 1947 absolute liability was repealed by Nevada (NEv. ComP. LAWS § 279 (Supp. 1949) providing a rebuttable presumption and impliedly overruling NEV. CoMp. LAws § 279 (1929)) and by
North Carolina (Session Laws 1947, c. 1069, s. 3, expressly repealing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 63-14 (1943)). In 1949 Maryland provided a rebuttable presumption of negligence
(MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 1A, § 9 (1951) ; South Dakota adopted the rules of
law applicable to torts in the state (S.D. CODE § 2.0305 (Supp. 1952)) ; and Wisconsin
provided a rebuttable presumption (WIs. STAT. § 114.05 (1953)). Indiana expressly
repealed section 5 in 1951 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 14-105 (Burns 1950) was repealed by

Acts 1951, ch. 267, § 26, p. 773, effective July 1, 1951).
8. Some authorities say the airplane is no longer a dangerous instrumentality and
should not be burdened by absolute liability. Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
in Aviation Law, 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 124, 127 (1944); Orr, Airplane Tort Law, 19
INS. COUNSEL J. 64, 66 (1952) ; Orr, Is Aviation Ultrahazardous?, 21 INs. COUNSEL J.
48 (1954); Comment, 16 GA. B. J. 239, 241 (1953) ; Note, 4 VAND. L. REV. 857, 861
(1951).

NOTES
used to determine liability.' Theories of liability ranging from trespass"0
to negligence" have been applied in the reported cases."
The varied theories used to determine liability are a contrast to the
uniformity of results-in practically all reported cases the plaintiff has
recovered. Even in the absence of the supposed basis of absolute liability-an ultrahazardous activity-the courts have imposed liability
which is absolute in effect." It appears that the true rationale for imposing liability without fault rests on considerations other than the
dangerousness of the activity involved.
One factor influencing such liability has been the shifting emphasis
of society. Tort law has not turned on technical theories but on the
social and economic requirements of the times.'4 At common law a man
9. In United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529, 533 (10th Cir. 1951), after using res
ipsa loquitur to determine liability, the court said that, since the United States was
clearly liable under that theory, passing upon the applicability of absolute liability was
unnecessary. It has been pointed out that res ipsa loquitur and the principle of strict
liability are rules which exist side by side and may be invoked alternatively. 3 HASTINGS
L.J. 79, 80 (1951).
10. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y. Supp. 469
(1933).
11. Boyd v. White, 128 C.A.2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954).
12. Res ipsa loquitur has been a favorite. United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d
529 (10th Cir. 1951) ; D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Parcell
v. United States, 104 F.Supp. 110 (S.D.W.Va. 1951); Kadylak v. O'Brien, 1941
U.S.Av.Rep. 8 (1941) ; Sollak v. State of New York, 1929 U.S.Av.Rep. 42 (1927).
13. "[I]t cannot be said that there is a uniform rule for ground injuries, but the
cases show certain tendencies: (1) A plane owner or operator will be held absolutely
liable for damage to property caused by an unauthorized landing or crash on that property." Binzer, Civil Aviation-Liability Problems of Air Carriers, 34 Ky. L. J.34, 48
(1945).
A 1941 article stated that airplane owners had been liable for property and personae
damages to ground occupiers in all reported cases to date, the legal theory being the
only problem unsettled. 12 J. AIR L. 377 (1941). Legislation imposing absolute liability in New York was considered unnecessary by one author since the New York
courts had not failed to give adequate relief in any instance. Orr, Tort Liability of
Airlines, 20 N.Y.S.B.A. 185, 191 (1948) and cases cited. A federal circuit court noted
that since it is usually impossible to establish with any certainty the cause of the accident, the application of res ipsa loquitur is not very different from that of absolute
liability. United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 1953). See also Comment, 38 CORNELL L. Q. 570, 576 (1953).
14. Contrast what was said by the same author in 1911 and in 1934. In 1911:
"What may appear desirable in an ancient and highly organized society . . . may be
utterly inappropriate and harmful in a newly settled country whose natural resources
still require exploitation. In the former, the natural tendency is to preserve the early
recognized right . . . as of paramount importance. In the latter the pressing need is
not the preservation of existing rights, not the proper distribution of wealth already in
existence, but its creation, the permutation of opportunity into wealth, and so the
tendency is to encourage an enterprise which tends toward the material development of
the country, even at the expense of the legal rights of the individuals." Bohlen, The
Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. OF PA. L. R v.298, 318 (1911).
In 1934: "It is significant that this tendency to bring American law into accord
with the British law synchronizes with the realization that America is no longer a
frontier country in which production activities are needed to develop latent and unlimited resources and that, therefore, the proper distribution of what we have is of
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was liable whenever he harmed another." American courts of the late
1800's criticized this view as considering only the suffering of the injured person and failing to see that shifting the loss or substituting one
suffering party for another must have some justification." They felt
the only basis for liability should be fault.'
Since the main interest of
society at that time was rapid industrial expansion, 8 the courts assessed
damages to the injured party only when the conduct of the actor fell
below some minimum standard of care. As the rapid growth of industry gave rise to new social considerations, the basis of recovery was
broadened to include other types of liability.' 9
In determining who should bear the losses connected with the
activity in question, the ultimate objective that the law intends to accomplish must be considered. Allegedly the two functions of tort law
are compensation of the injured party and deterrence of negligent conduct.2" However, the "injured party" is a legalistic concept and must
be determined by the application of laws. 1 Moreover, ascertaining
what conduct is to be labeled "negligent" is also a function of the theory
of law which is applied." An examination and balancing of the opposmore importance than the production of a surplus which, to say the least, is embarrassing." Bohlen, Aviation Under the Common Law, 6 AIR L. REv. 155, 156 (1935),

48 HARV. L. REV. 216, 217 (1934).
15. 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY

OF ENGLISH LAW, 446 (1926).
16. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 446 (1873).
17. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292, 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
See also L.R. & F.S.
Railway v. Finley, 37 Ark. 562 (1881) ; Beatty v. Central Iowa R.R., 58 Iowa 242, 12
N.W. 332 (1882) ; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873) ; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y.
476 (1873) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886).
18. One court summed up the prevailing ideas of the times: "We must have
factories, machinery, dams, canals, and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold
wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization." Losee v. Buchanan, 51
N.Y. 476, 484 (1873).
19. Workmen's compensation is the classic example. Negligence, with its defenses
of contributory negligence, fellow servant's negligence, and assumption of the risk, was
thought inapplicable to the conditions of modern employment. The causes of industrial
accidents were often so obscure and complex that it was impossible for an accurate
judgment, and the delay and expense amounted to a defeat of justice. The injured
workman was left to assume the greater part of industrial accident loss which he was
usually unable to bear; he and those dependent upon him frequently became a burden
upon public or private charity. New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197
(1917).
20. EIRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT, 38 (1951); Morris, Rough Justice
and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730, 733 (1930).
21. The law does not attempt redress for every loss. For example, the party is
not injured in the eyes of the law if he was contributorily negligent or if the actor was
privileged.
22. "It is fundamental that the standard of conduct which is the basis of the law
of negligence is determined by balancing the risk, in the light of the social value of
the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the harm, against the value of
the interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued. For this reason, it is seldom possible to reduce negligence to any definite rules;

NOTES
ing interests which operate in an area seems to be the means of determining what theory of law will accomplish the most desirable results.
In conflict are two interests of society, the one being encouraging the
activity and the other protecting the wronged.
The law which is applied materially affects the development of the
activity.2 3

Indeed the extent of tort liability placed on the aviation in-

dustry is a major factor in gauging its growth.2" Rapid expansion of
aviation might be accomplished by not holding the industry to a high
standard of care and by letting injured persons protect themselves as
best they can.2 ' A consideration of the many hardships to ground occupiers who are injured or whose property is damaged by falling aircraft,
however, suggests that it might be better to protect all injured persons
from the economic consequences of airplane crashes despite the adverse
effect on the progress of the industry itself.6
One approach to the problem of airplane damage to persons and
property on the ground is to let the loss lie where it falls, damages being
granted only in the event that the conduct of the airplane owners falls
below a minimum standard of care." But under a negligence theory the
plaintiff would have difficulty in proving liability of the airplane owner
due to the nature of such accidents. The entire airplane may be destroyed; witnesses in the airplane may be killed; the operation of the
airplane is so technical that eye witnesses may only give evidence of
speculative value; the course of flight is difficult to reconstruct; the
suddenness of the accident makes eyewitness evidence difficult to obtain."8
it is 'relative to the need and the occasion,' and conduct which would be proper under
some circumstances becomes negligence under others." PROSSER, TORTS, 223 (1941).
23. See note 25 infra.
24. For a short discussion on this point, see Vold, Aircraft Operator'sLiability for
Ground Damage and PassengerInjury, 13 NEB. L. REv. 373, 383 (1935).
25. The early courts protected the railroads. "Railroads have been subsidized by
throwving upon travelers over highway crossings the burden of acting so carefully as to
make the negligent operation of the road incapable of injuring, instead of requiring the
railroads to protect the travelers upon the highway by adequate guards, safety gates, or
by lowering or raising their tracks below or above the highway." Bohlen, Aviation

under the Common Law, 6 AiR L. REv. 155, 157, 48 HARV. L. REv. 216, 218 (1934).
"Such increase of danger is necessarily incident to, and attendant upon, this improved mode of transportation. All persons must accept the advantages of this mode
of intercommunication with the danger and inconveniences which necessarily attend it;

the price of progress cannot be withheld." Beatty v. Central Iowa R. R., 58 Iowa 242,
247, 12 N.W. 332, 334 (1882).
26. See notes 35, 36, and 37, infra.
27. RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 282 (1938), defines negligence as conduct "which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm."
28. Dean Wigmore reported that in no more than 20% of the accidents through

1937 would it have been possible for the plaintiff to find and produce provable evidence
of the real cause of the accident. A Survey of the Independent Air Safety Board covering accidents involving passenger fatalities in 1939 disclosed that plaintiff could estab-
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Today the CAB determines the causes of most accidents, "9 but no part
of any report is admissible in an action for damages growing out of
matter mentioned in the report."
Difficulty of proof should not be
overemphasized, as CAB reports are open to the public and can give
valuable leads; also, more complete records are kept in airline operations
than perhaps any other industry.1
Res ipsa loquitur as a procedural device shifts these evidentiary
disadvantages to the defendant.3 2 Actually, rather than helping in the
determination of negligence in this area, res ipsa loquitur imposes an
absolute liability. 3 Since the defendant airplane-owner also will very
possibly be unable to produce an explanation of the accident, he will lose. 4
Yet negligence as the basis of liability, without res ipsa loquitur,
might place the loss on the ground occupier due to difficulty of proof.
The injured party on the ground has no means of protection other than
insurance.3
His property will usually be insured against loss;3" it is
doubtful that he would be protected by personal injury insurance."
lish liability in about 34% of all cases. Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential?, 19 3. AIR L. & Com. 166, 168 (1952). A discussion of the plaintiff's
plight can be found in O'Connor, Res Ipsa in. the Air, 22 IND. L. J. 221, 22-7 (1947).
29. In only one in thirty-seven cases reported from December, 1946, to May, 1948,
did the board fail to establish the probable cause of the accident. McLarty, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV. 55, 57 (1951).
30. 52 STAT. 1012 (1949), 49 U.S.C. § 581 (1952). For a discussion of this statute
see Simpson, Use of Aircraft Accident Irvestigation Information in Actions for Damages, 17 3. AIR L. 283 (1950).
31. See McLarty, supra note 29, at 58; Orr, Airplane Tort Law, 19 INs. COUNSEL
J. 64, 67 (1952).
32. One of the reasons for applying res ipsa loquitur is that the duty of explaining
the accident should rest upon the defendant because of his greater knowledge or greater
means of knowledge. O'Connor, supra note 28, at 221; Reiber, Some Aspects of Air
Carriers'Liability, 11 LAW & CONTE-MP. PROB. 524, 530 (1946).
33. Comment, 38 CORNELL L. Q. 570, 576 (1953). See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2509 (3d ed. 1940) for other illustrations of how res ipsa loquitur is used to impose
liability absolute in effect.
34. "It is generally impossible to establish with any certainty the cause of the
falling of an airplane. To apply the res ipsa loquitur rule, as we did in the D'Anna case,
supra, is, as stated not very different from applying the rule of strict liability.
United States v. Praylou, 308 F.2d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 1953).
35. The property owner can see the road or railroad near the property and note
the type of traffic. If a person is buying property, he can consider the dangers from
automobiles or trains; if he is building, he can situate his structure accordingly. All
property, however, no matter how or where it is built, could be damaged by an airplane
accident. See Binzer, supra note 13, at 46; Goldin, supra note 8, at 125; Newman,
Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (1929).
36. Most real property of any appreciable value is insured against loss by fire,
storm, and various other destructive forces. Comprehensive policies are usually broad
enough to include damage by airplanes, some policies expressly including such damage.
See Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L. J. 1172
(1952).
37. For a discussion of the plight of uncompensated accident victims, see Corstvet,
The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 46
(1936).

NOTES
Property losses might be spread among all owners; the burden of per-

sonal injuries would remain on the individual concerned.

However, with

the adoption of compulsory health insurance, which in one form or an-

other seems remotely possible, public attitude might change from one of
compensation to one of deterrence in the tort law; the pressing need of
the injured person would no longer be before the court.

Another approach to the problem is to let the airplane owners be
liable without fault."8

In this era of large scale enterprise it is normally

possible for activities to bear the losses which can reasonably be anticipated as a consequence of ,their being carried on, without disastrous results to the activity. 9 Enterprise liability has been justified on the
theory that the person who receives the benefits of the activity rather
than the innocent members of society should bear the losses.4" The actor
can pass the loss to the consumers by increasing the cost of his services
or goods. The actor can better insure than the average member of
society who cannot possibly foresee all the ways in which he could suffer losses. 4'
The suggestion that an enterprise should bear all losses incidental
to its continuing operation, passing that cost on to the public which must
38. This has been justified by classifying aviation as a dangerous activity. See
note 1 supra; Prentiss v. National Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 306, 311-13 (D.N.J. 1953);
Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110, 116 (S.D.W.Va. 1951) ; Vold, Strict Liability
for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landing on Ground Victims Outside of Established
Landing Areas, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17 (1953). Other reasons advanced have been that
absolute liability will be the greatest incentive for the development of safety, Void,
Aircraft Operator'sLiability for Ground Damage and PassengerInjury, 13 NEB. L. REV.
373, 382 (1935) ; that the risk involved is one-sided (the ground-owner never threatens
the aviator), Void, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landing on Ground
Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17 (1953) ; Wherry,
Aeronautics and the Problem of Tort Liability, 10 AIR L. REv. 337, 346 (1939) ; and that
all the benefits accrue directly to the aviator, Void, Aircraft Operator's Liability for
Ground Damage and Passenger Injury, 13 NEB. L. REv. 373, 382 (1935); Note, 33
COLUm. L. REv. 1459, 1460 (1933). The extreme difficulty of the injured party proving the cause of the accident has been considered. Newman, supra note 35, at 1042.
Res ipsa loquitur may solve these problems. See notes 33, 34 supra.
39. For an excellent discussion of enterprise liability see EHRMNZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE
WITHOUT FAULT

(1951).

40. This has been suggested in airplane damage to ground occupiers. "It must be
kept in mind that, when damage occurs in such a case, one or the other party has to
stand it, and no reason readily suggests itself why it should not be the one who has
brought about the chance occurrence." Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148
Misc. 849, 852, 266 N.Y.Supp. 469, 473 (1933). Note, 33 COLUMf. L. REv. 1459 (1933).
41. "The best and most efficient way to do this is to assure the accident victims
of compensation, and to distribute the losses involved over society as a whole or some
very large segment of it. Such a basis for administering losses may be called social
insurance.
"This at once brings in an important new element. For while no social good may
come from the mere shifting of a loss, society does benefit from the wide and regular
distribution of losses taken alone." James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J.549, 550 (1948). See also EHRENZWEIG, op.
cit. supra note 39, at 41.
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decide whether the cost justifies the enterprise, is not without merit.
Two considerations must be balanced: using an enterprise to distribute
reasonably foreseeable losses caused by it, and burdening enterprise
growth and depriving society of the additional benefits which that enterprise would contribute.42 Even if the balance is in favor of encouraging the development of aviation, the relative infrequency of. airplane
damage to property and persons on the ground suggests that the cost of
absolute liability would not seriously hamper continued operation of commercial airplanes. 3 Moreover, though absolute liability does impose a
financial burden, it is doubtful that the best way to subsidize the activity
is to force innocently injured individuals to bear the cost of continued
operation. 4 As important as the continued development of civil aviation
is believed to be, no, convincing reason has been advanced why it should
be subsidized by the luckless victim on the ground who has no direct
connection with the airplane owner. If aviation must be subsidized, a
fairer distribution of the burden would place the cost upon the public
treasury either by direct grant or under the guise of contracts for carrying mail.4
Whether absolute liability would discourage widespread ownership
of private airplanes is difficult to ascertain; liability insurance for these
airplanes should not be prohibitive.46 Insurance has been one of the
prime considerations in the advancement of enterprise liability.4
The Rome Convention of 1952, which dealt with ground damages
caused by aircraft outside their home nations, adopted an absolute lia42. Note, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 275 (1949).
43. It has been stated that aviation is a type of enterprise which can distribute the
losses it causes to the ground occupier by its use of insurance and price calculation.
Void, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landing on Ground Victins
Outside of Established Landing Areas, 5 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 20 (1953). The relatively
few airplane accidents and the large volume of business carried on by the commercial
airlines suggest this. Note 4 supra and note 66 infra. However property damage can
be extensive; only the large airlines could withstand some losses. See note 68 infra.
44. Note, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 275 (1949).
45. Bohlen, Aviation under the Common Law, 48 HARV. L. REV. 216, 219 (1934),
6 AIR L. REV. 155, 157 (1935) ; Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Esscn.tia,U, 19 J. AIR L. & Com. 166, 317, 324 (1952).
46. One writer suggests that to impose absolute liability would result in no person
daring to own an aircraft without fantastically high limits of insurance. Orr, Tort Liability of Airlines, 20 N.Y.S.B.A. 185, 191 (1948). Another author stated that rates
for compulsory insurance for small aircraft would cost $60 to $70 per year and that any
private flyer unable to pay that ought not be permitted to endanger life and property.
Schnader, Uniform Aviation Liability Act, 9 J. AIR L. 664, 669 (1938).
47. EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 39, at 4, 30, 42; Friedmann, Social Insurance
and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HARv. L. REV. 241 (1949) ; James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).

NOTES
bility limited in amount. 8 The amount of liability was ascertained by
balancing the need to keep the limits low enough to prevent the cost of
third party insurance from becoming an excessive burden on civil aviation and high enough to compensate third parties in all but extremely
rare catastrophic accidents. 9 If adopted in this country, however, absolute liability limited in amount might deprive claimants of substantial
rights without due process when negligence could be proved." Probably
the airplane industry would welcome limitations since plaintiffs have2
51
been unusually successful in the past and damage can be extensive.1
Other areas of the law have been governed by absolute liability
even though definitely not ultrahazardous. Publishing,"2 radio broadcasting, 4 and respondeat superior"' are examples. The classical example
of enterprise liability has been workman's compensation. It was the apparent belief of the legislatures that the losses to society in injured' workmen should be borne by the industrial enterprise which necessitated such
losses."0
48. For discussions of these limitations see Coblentz, Limitation of Liability for
Aircraft, 23 So. CALIF. L. REv. 473 (1950) and Shelley, The Draft Rome Convention
from the Standpoint of Residents and Other Persons in this Country, 19 J. AIR L. & Com.
289 (1952).
49. Comment, 31 CAN. B. REv. 90, 93 (1953).
50. See Shelley, supra note 48, at 303.
51. See note 13 supra.
52. See note 68 infra.
53. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909); Washington Post Co. v.
Kennedy, 3 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1925) ; Butler v. Every Evening Printing Co., 140 Fed.
934 (3rd Cir. 1905) ; Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 Pac. 530 (1911) ; Corrigan v.
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920) ; Laudati v. Stea, 44 R.I. 303, 117
Atl. 422 (1922); Carey v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 19 Wash.2d 655, 143 P.2d 857
(1943).
54. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932) ; Miles v. Wasmer Inc.,
172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
55. EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 39, at 67-73; James, Vicarious Liability, 28
TUL. L. REV. 161 (1954). "I am liable for what is done for me and under my orders
by the man I employ . . . and the reason that I am liable is this, that by employing
him I set the whole thing in motion; and what he does, being done for my benefit and
under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of doing it." Duncan v.
Findlater, 6 Clark & F. 894, 910, 7 Eng. Rep. 934, 940 (H.L. 1839).
56. "Within its sphere this too provides a measure of compensation tailored to
need and not to fault, and provides effective means for distributing accident losses
among the beneficiaries of the enterprise that created the risks that caused the losses."
James, supra note 55, at 171. See also note 19 supra.
Under FELA, although couched in terms of negligence, recovery by the plaintiff
seems to be the court's paramount concern. The standard of fault indicates that the
principle is without much practical meaning. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 76
(1949) (dissent). In that case Justice Frankfurter, in concurring, said: "The difficulties in these cases derive largely from the outmoded concept of 'negligence' as a
working principle for the adjustments of injuries inevitable under the technological
circumstances of modern industry." Id. at 65. Even under FELA, however, injuries
which cannot be anticipated and against which the defendant could not adequately protect himself by insurance and cost calculation may be uncompensated. Recovery for
physical consequences of fright and shock which resulted from the plaintiff's seeing
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Enterprise liability has crept into other areas which theoretically
require negligence for recovery. This encroachment has been made possible by a standard of care so elastic that sonie breach of duty can usually
be discovered, by a shifting of the burden of proof, by presumptions and
inferences, and by use of res ipsa loquitur.57 In the food products cases,
for instance, the manufacturer has been liable on a mere fiction of negligence.58 This liability has been justified on the ground that the manufacturer is in a better position to stand the immediate loss. He may
cover that loss by insurance or by shifting the risk directly to the general
public in the form of higher priced commodities.59
An analogy may be drawn between the liability of automobile
owners and airplane owners. Although automobiles are more numerous,
cause more damage, and create a graver social problem, it is likely that
in the foreseeable future the airplane will be as popular and as widely
used as the automobile is today.
Automobile liability is considered in terms of negligence; however,
modern writers, influenced no doubt by widely held insurance and settlement practices of insurance companies," accept as the true basis a doctrine approaching liability without fault.61 Today the objective seems to
another person placed in peril by defendant's conduct was recently denied. Angst v.
Great Northern Railway, 131 F.Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955).
57. These devices allow the plaintiff to take the case to the jury without proof
of negligence; in some situations the defendant cannot possibly explain the accident.
See Gregory, Trespass to Negligenwe to Absoltte Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 381
(1951) ; Leflar, Negligence in Name Oidy, 27 N. Y. U. L. REv. 564, 580, (1952) ; McBratney, New Trends Toward Liability Without Fault, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 140, 149
(1953). See also note 34 supra.
58. For a recent and detailed discussion, see Note, 29 IND. L. J. 173 (1954). "In
the food products cases the courts have resorted to various fictions to rationalize the
extension of the manufacturer's warranty to the consumer: that a warranty runs with
the chattel; that the cause of action of the dealer is assigned to the consumer: that the
consumer is a third party beneficiary of the manufacturer's contract with the dealer.
They have also held the manufacturer liable on a mere fiction of negligence." Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 465, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (1944) (Concurring
opinion). See Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937).
59. Jeanblanc, supra note 58, at 158.
60. Settlement practices studied under the auspices of Columbia University Council
for Research in the Social Sciences with the aid of the Yale Law School showed that
some payment is made in about 85% of motor vehicle accidents causing personal injury or death where the defendant had insurance. The promptness of the settlement
declined with the seriousness of the loss. Some non-legal factors have caused this
trend-every claim has a nuisance value, prompt settlement promotes good public relations and encourages sales, the insureds do not like to take time to defend, and the
injured plaintiffs as a class are prospective customers. The legal factor in encouraging
settlement is that juries today are very favorable to the plaintiffs. James. Accident
Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549, 566-67
(1948).
61. Feezer, A Circle Tour Through Negligence, 27 N. Y. U. L. REv. 647. 653
(1952) ; Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLU.
L. REv. 300 (1950) ; James, supra note 60.

NOTES
be compensation of the injured person. The loss in wages, the medical
expenses, and the sudden loss of the wage earner by the family following
the accident all carry consequences not restricted to the victim himself.6"
The family purpose and the frolic and detour doctrines have been developed to assure the injured party of a solvent defendant.6" Financial
responsibility statutes have been adopted in most states.64 Massachusetts
has gone a step further and enacted compulsory insurance legislation.6 5
Some authorities have even favored adopting social insurance for automobile victims similar to workman's compensation.6 Automobile ownership, with the opportunity to spread losses through insurance, constitutes
an enterprise for integrating the fairly regular losses into the economy
with as little disharmony as possible. Imposing this burden on automobile owners apparently has not discouraged the ownership of automobiles
as evidenced by their rapid increase in numbers. Restriction of the
activity is not an inevitable result of spreading losses to third persons.67
If automobile liability and airplane liability for ground damage have
certain similarities, a theory of liability applicable to the one might
seem useful for the other. Automobile liability is presently determined
by negligence theories; under such theories enterprise liability has resulted in practice. However, to say that a negligence theory as applied
to aircraft liability for ground damages would result in an acceptable and
predictable method of diversifying the loss through enterprise liability
62. One writer emphasizes the seriousness of the problem by saying that the two
greatest single causes of accidental injuries are industrial and automobile accidents.
Both classes of accidents are a product of the machine age and cannot be substantially
reduced by safety measures. Grad, supra note 61, at 325.
63. The insurance companies have contributed to this trend by policies protecting
the mere borrower of a car under the owner's insurance, extending coverage to the in-.
sured while he is driving another's car, and providing limited payment to injured occupants of the insured's car without regard to fault. James, supra note 60, at 565.
64. The old type legislation was largely a safety measure to quarantine the careless driver and force him to become financially responsible; the new legislation places
more emphasis on compensation of the accident victims. In 1950 forty-four states had
legislation on financial responsibility. Grad, supra note 61, at 307-09.

65. MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 90, § 34 A-J (1954). Compulsory insurance has been
strongly recommended for Minnesota. 27 MINN. L. REv. 103 (1942).
66. The most detailed and comprehensive report was the Report by the Committee
to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (Columbia University Council for
Research in the Social Sciences 1932), known as the Columbia Report. For a recent
study recommending social insurance for automobile victims see Grad, supra note 61.
67. The growth of commercial airlines has been phenomenal. Passenger movement in 1952 was 15% greater than that for 1951 and over two and a half times that
of 1946; in the 1946-1952 period world air cargo traffic increased more than 500 percent; much air cargo is carried by non-scheduled operators. In 1946 the passengermiles by air were less than a third of those by Pullman (1st class) ; however in 1952
air travel exceeded Pullman by 20 percent. On overseas routes more passengers travelled
by airplane than by ship. In 1952 the number of revenue passengers increased to
27,386,405; the passenger miles increased to 16,173,405,000. Orr, Is Aviation Ultrahacardous?,21 INs. COUNSEL J. 48, 53 (1954).
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ignores a basic dichotomy between the two areas. Automobile accidents
which culminate in litigation usually involve personal injury; property
damage is incidental. Aircraft ground damage, in monetary terms, consists primarily of property destruction."8 This difference as to type of
damage sought through lawsuits may well result in a totally dissimilar
development in the law which will be applied. Though the theory applied
in personal injury cases is negligence, an injured plaintiff is more likely
to recover, regardless of fault, because personal injuries apparently
present a clear and immediate need for compensatory damages to any
court or jury. But since property damage presents no such compelling
need for compensation, a negligence theory will often result in a denial
of recovery to a plaintiff whose property has been damaged.6 9 A
negligence theory in aviation law will not evolve a predictable type of
enterprise liability.
If tort law is to adjust to the socio-economic requirements of the
society which it governs, the interest of compensating the injured person must be constantly weighed against the interest of encouraging the
development of the activity by not imposing oppressive burdens of liab'ility. Third parties must be protected against unreasonable risk of
harm; "unreasonableness," however, is to be interpreted in the light of
the period. Fifty years ago a person was protected from negligent conduct and from ultrahazardous activities; if the actor used due care in
pursuing common activities, he was protected. Rapid expansion of the
economy was of paramount interest. Today the compensation of the
injured parties has become a more acute problem than economic expansion. Thus an activity developed in the last half century may have
been caught in a dilemma, it being subjected to absolute liability fifty
years ago because it was ultrahazardous and today, although no longer
ultrahazardous, because of the shifted emphasis of society. The study
of liability growing out of aircraft damages to ground occupiers clearly
indicates the hazards of compromising or distorting old principles of
law to meet current societal needs. The concept of negligence has
been used to allow recovery when fault by the defendant has been without basis in fact. Also res ipsa loquitur has been used when the defend68. This is evidenced by reported accidents. May 20, 1943-a B-24 hit a gasholder in Chicago causing $15,000 worth of gas to escape and destroying the $1,250,000
gas-holder. March 6, 1945-a C-60 crashed into the doors of a hangar at flying speed
causing property damage amounting to $3,000,000. Reiber, supra note 32, at 524 n. 1.
69. This difference in attitudes of the courts and the juries is brought out in cases
involving warranties. The courts adopt a much more liberal attitude toward recovery
in warranty actions involving a bodily injury than in those based upon property damage.
The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3) also draws a distinction between personal
and property harms calling disclaimers for personal harms "prima facie unconscionable."
Note, 29 IND. L. J. 173, 182 (1954).
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ant obviously could not overcome the effects of that procedural device.
Only a few areas of the law, such as workman's compensation, have
been settled by legislation.
The basic problem of the law is twofold: determining the proper
incidence of an economic burden and formulating the role of the courts
and the legislature in accomplishing the desired results. As long as objectives are being attained under varied and contradictory legal theories,
results may not be consistent. If public policy demands that those pursuing an activity be absolutely liable, the legislature should act accordingly. If negligence should be the basis of recovery, the courts should
not adopt res ipsa loquitur and other devices which in effect impose
an absolute liability."0 A settled theory is necessary in order that the
various classes of litigants involved in future cases may take adequate
safeguards by insurance and cost calculation."' If the activity is one
particularly adaptable to enterprise liability, the actor should prepare himself to withstand liability when the risks of his activity mature.

HOW STATES SHOULD RESOLVE CONFLICTS PROBLEMS
UNDER THE DIRECT ACTION STATUTE-AN APPROACH
Recent insurance legislation has given rise to many interesting conflict of laws questions. Since their resolution by the courts will materially affect the rights of the injured party, the insured, and the insurer,
a critical analysis of these questions seems in order.
To balance more equally the interests of insurance companies, in2
jured and insured parties,' states have nullified the "no action" clause
which changes the essential nature of the insurance contract from lia70. Failure of the courts to establish a definite standard for liability in the food
products cases has been criticized. "In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule
approaches the rule of strict liability. It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the
basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If public
policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality regardless
of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly." Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion).
71. "The entire field of liability is in a phase of adjustment. There is, on the part
of the public, an increasing dissatisfaction for the way liability claims are handled.
Insurance companies are not satisfied either. Verdicts are unpredictable. The guiding
principles of liability are insufficiently clear and a satisfactory distribution of the loss
foreseeable is practically an impossible task." Niccolini, Liability Without Negligence,

1954 INs. L. J. 527, 554 (1954).
1. It has been contended that in liability insurance, the needs of only two basic
groups must be satisfied-the claimant who seeks compensation for his loss and the
policyholder who needs protection against financial hardship or ruin. Smithsom, A
Philosophy of Liability Insurance, 1953 INs. L.J. 663.
2. For discussion of trends of modern legislation to circumvent this "no action"

